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the athens affair
On 9 March 2005, 
a 38-year-old Greek 
electrical engineer 
named costas Tsalikidis 
was found hanged in his 
athens loft apartment, 
an apparent suicide. It 
would prove to be merely 
the first public news of 
a scandal that would roil Greece 
for months.
The next day, the prime minister 
of Greece was told that his cellphone 
was being bugged, as were those of the 
mayor of athens and at least 100 other 
high-ranking dignitaries, including an 
employee of the U.S. embassy.
The victims were customers of athens-
based Vodafone-Panafon, generally 
known as Vodafone 
Greece, the coun-
try’s largest cel-
lular service pro-
vider;  Tsalikidis 
was in charge of 
network planning 
at the company. a 
connection seemed 
obvious. Given the 
list of people and their posi-
tions at the time of the tapping, 
we can only imagine the sen-
sitive political and diplomatic 
discussions, high-stakes busi-
ness deals, or even marital 
indiscretions that may have 
been routinely overheard and, 
quite possibly, recorded.
how some extremely 
smart hackers 
pulled off the most 
audacious cell-network 
break-in ever 
By Vassilis Prevelakis
& Diomidis Spinellis
crIMe
Even before Tsalikidis’s death, 
investigators had found rogue soft­
ware installed on the Vodafone 
Greece phone network by parties 
unknown. Some extraordinarily 
knowledgeable people either pen­
etrated the network from outside or 
subverted it from within, aided by 
an agent or mole. In either case, the 
software at the heart of the phone 
system, investigators later discov­
ered, was reprogrammed with a 
finesse and sophistication rarely 
seen before or since.
A study of the Athens affair, surely 
the most bizarre and embarrassing 
scandal ever to engulf a major cell­
phone service provider, sheds consid­
erable light on the measures networks 
can and should take to reduce their 
vulnerability to hackers and moles.
It’s also a rare opportunity to get 
a glimpse of one of the most elusive 
of cybercrimes. Major network pene­
trations of any kind are exceedingly 
uncommon. They are hard to pull off, 
and equally hard to investigate.
Even among major criminal infil­
trations, the Athens affair stands 
out because it may have involved 
state secrets, and it targeted indi­
viduals—a combination that, if 
it had ever occurred before, was 
not disclosed publicly. The most 
notorious penetration to compro­
mise state secrets was that of the 
“Cuckoo’s Egg,” a name bestowed 
by the wily network administrator 
who successfully pursued a German 
programmer in 1986. The program­
mer had been selling secrets about 
the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative 
(“Star Wars”) to the Soviet KGB.
But unlike the Cuckoo’s Egg, the 
Athens affair targeted the conversa­
tions of specific, highly placed gov­
ernment and military officials. Given 
the ease with which the conversations 
could have been recorded, it is gener­
ally believed that they were. But no 
one has found any recordings, and 
we don’t know how many of the calls 
were recorded, or even listened to, by 
the perpetrators. Though the scope 
of the activity is to a large extent 
unknown, it’s fair to say that no other 
computer crime on record has had the 
same potential for capturing informa­
tion about affairs of state.
While this is the first major 
infiltration to involve cellphones, 
the scheme did not depend on the 
wireless nature of the network. 
Basically, the hackers broke into a 
telephone network and subverted 
its built­in wiretapping features for 
their own purposes. That could have 
been done with any phone account, 
not just cellular ones. Nevertheless, 
there are some elements of the 
Vodafone Greece system that were 
unique and crucial to the way the 
crime was pulled off.
We still don’t know who com­
mitted this crime. A big reason is 
that the UK­based Vodafone Group, 
one of the largest cellular providers 
in the world, bobbled its handling of 
some key log files. It also reflexively 
removed the rogue software, instead 
of letting it continue to run, tipping 
off the perpetrators that their intru­
sion had been detected and giving 
them a chance to run for cover. The 
company was fined €76 million this 
past December. 
To piece together this story, we 
have pored through hundreds of pages 
of depositions, taken by the Greek 
parliamentary committee investi­
gating the affair, obtained through 
a freedom of information request 
filed with the Greek Parliament. We 
also read through hundreds of pages 
of documentation and other records, 
 supplemented by publicly available 
information and interviews with inde­
pendent experts and sources associ­
ated with the case. What emerges 
are the technical details, if not the 
motivation, of a devilishly clever and 
complicated computer infiltration.
The cellphone bugging began some­
time during the fevered run­up to 
the August 2004 Olympic Games 
in Athens. It remained undetected 
until 24 January 2005, when one 
of Vodafone’s telephone switches 
generated a sequence of error mes­
sages indicating that text messages 
originating from another cellphone 
operator had gone undelivered. The 
switch is a computer­controlled 
component of a phone network that 
connects two telephone lines to com­
plete a telephone call. To diagnose 
the failures, which seemed highly 
unusual but reasonably innocuous 
at the time, Vodafone contacted the 
maker of the switches, the Swedish 
telecommunications equipment 
manufacturer Ericsson.
We now know that the illegally 
implanted software, which was 
eventually found in a total of four of 
the athens affair
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ce0s, MPs & a PM 
The illegally wiretapped cellphones in the Athens 
affair included those of the prime minister, his 
defense and foreign affairs ministers, top military 
and law enforcement officials, the Greek EU com-
missioner, activists, and journalists.
On 6 April 2006, Bill Zikou, 
CEO of Ericsson Hellas, was 
 summoned to give evidence 
before a parliamentary 
committee looking into the 
scandal. His company pro-
vided the telecommunica-
tions switching equipment 
that rogue programmers 
broke into.
Vodafone Greece CEO GiorGos 
koronias ordered the removal 
of the surveillance program, 
because, as he explained in 
a February 2006 newspaper 
interview, “the company had to 
react immediately.” Removing 
the program is thought to have 
tipped off the perpetrators and 
helped them evade capture.
Greek Prime Minister Costas 
karamanlis was only the 
most notable of the 100 
or so individuals illegally 
wiretapped, which, besides 
the country’s political, law 
enforcement, and military elite, 
included Karamanlis’s wife.
Costas tsalikidis was found 
hanged, an apparent sui-
cide, just before the Athens 
affair became public. As a 
 telecommunications engineer 
in charge of network planning 
at Vodafone, he was ideally 
placed to be either an inside 
 accomplice or discoverer of 
the digital break-in. But his 
 involvement in the case has 
never been established.
GiorGos VoulGarakis was 
the first government official 
to whom Koronias disclosed 
the case. Giannis Angelou, 
the director of the Prime 
Minister’s political office,  
was also present.
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Vodafone’s Greek switches, created paral­
lel streams of digitized voice for the tapped 
phone calls. One stream was the ordinary 
one, between the two calling parties. The 
other stream, an exact copy, was directed to 
other cellphones, allowing the tappers to lis­
ten in on the conversations on the cellphones, 
and probably also to record them. The soft­
ware also routed location and other informa­
tion about those phone calls to these shadow 
handsets via automated text messages.
Five weeks after the first messaging 
failures, on 4 March 2005, Ericsson alerted 
Vodafone that unauthorized software had 
been installed in two of Vodafone’s central 
offices. Three days later, Vodafone tech­
nicians isolated the rogue code. The next 
day, 8 March, the CEO of Vodafone Greece, 
Giorgos Koronias, ordered technicians to 
remove the software.
Then events took a deadly turn. On 
9 March, Tsalikidis, who was to be married 
in three months, was found hanged in his 
apartment. No one knows whether his appar­
ent suicide was related to the case, but many 
observers have speculated that it was.
The day after Tsalikidis’s body was dis­
covered, CEO Koronias met with the direc­
tor of the Greek prime minister’s political 
office. Yiannis Angelou, and the minis­
ter of public order, Giorgos Voulgarakis. 
Koronias told them that rogue software 
used the lawful wiretapping mechanisms 
of Vodafone’s digital switches to tap about 
100 phones and handed over a list of bugged 
numbers. Besides the prime minister and 
his wife, phones belonging to the minis­
ters of national defense, foreign affairs, and 
justice, the mayor of Athens, and the Greek 
European Union commissioner were all 
compromised. Others belonged to members 
of civil rights organizations, peace activists, 
and antiglobalization groups; senior staff at 
the ministries of National Defense, Public 
Order, Merchant Marine, and Foreign 
Affairs; the New Democracy ruling party; 
the Hellenic Navy general staff; and a 
Greek­American employee at the United 
States Embassy in Athens.
Within weeks of the initial discovery 
of the tapping scheme, Greek government 
and independent authorities launched 
five different investigations aimed at 
answering three main questions: Who 
was responsible for the bugging? Was 
Tsalikidis’s death related to the scandal? 
And how did the perpetrators pull off this 
audacious scheme?
To undersTand how someone could secretly 
listen to the conversations of Greece’s most 
senior officials, we have to look at the infra­
structure that makes it possible.
First, consider how a phone call, yours 
or a prime minister’s, gets completed. Long 
before you dial a number on your handset, 
your cellphone has been communicating 
with nearby cellular base stations. One of 
those stations, usually the nearest, has 
agreed to be the intermediary between your 
phone and the network as a whole. Your 
telephone handset converts your words 
into a stream of digital data that is sent to 
a transceiver at the base station.
The base station’s activities are gov­
erned by a base station controller, a 
 special­purpose computer within the 
station that allocates radio channels and 
helps coordinate handovers between the 
transceivers under its control.
This controller in turn communi­
cates with a mobile switching center that 
takes phone calls and connects them to 
call recipients within the same switching 
center, other switching centers within the 
company, or special exchanges that act 
as gateways to foreign networks, routing 
calls to other telephone networks (mobile 
or landline). The mobile switching centers 
are particularly important to the Athens 
affair because they hosted the rogue 
phone­tapping software, and it is there 
that the eavesdropping originated. They 
were the logical choice, because they are 
at the heart of the network; the intruders 
needed to take over only a few of them in 
order to carry out their attack.
Both the base station controllers and the 
switching centers are built around a large 
computer, known as a switch, capable of 
creating a dedicated communications path 
between a phone within its network and, 
in principle, any other phone in the world. 
Switches are holdovers from the 1970s, an 
era when powerful computers filled rooms 
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2002 2004 2005
JAN MAR MAy JUl                                    SEP NOV
2003
20 Jan Ericsson delivers 
R9.1 system software 
containing partial LI 
 functionality to Vodafone.
31 Jan Ericsson provides 
Vodafone with the details 
of its R9.1 software, which 
includes lawful inter­
ception (LI) capability.
20 Jan Shadow phones operate in 
Lycabettus restaurant in Athens.
24 Jan–1 Feb Two test numbers are 
configured for interception at a fourth 
exchange, MEAPA.
24 Jan The MEAPA exchange begins 
logging forlopp errors.
25 Jan The MEAPA exchange stops 
logging forlopp errors.
27 Jan Credits are added to the 
shadow phone accounts.
31 Jan Shadow phones make one call 
and forward another. The call recipient 
then sends an SMS message to itself.
11 Feb MEAKF upgrades 
from R9.1 to R10 software, 
destroying the rogue code.
18 Feb Credits are added to 
the shadow phone accounts.
18 Feb Shadow phones 
 operate in Lycabettus 
restaurant.
JAN JAN
4 Aug Nine more shadow phones 
are registered.
4–10 Aug Rogue software is 
installed in three exchanges: 
MEAKS, MEAKF, MEAPS.
9–11 Aug Rogue software is con­
figured with interception numbers.
13 Aug Opening ceremony of the 
Athens 2004 Olympic Games.
from alpha 
to omega
JAN MAR MAy JUl                                    SEP NOV
6 Jun Accounts for 
first two shadow 
phones are created.
9 Jun Three more 
shadow phones are 
registered.
29 Jun One shadow 
phone makes two 
 outgoing calls.
27–29 Oct 
Rogue software 
is installed in 
the MEAPA 
exchange but 
is not used for 
monitoring.
and were built around proprietary hardware 
and software. Though these computers are 
smaller nowadays, the system’s basic archi­
tecture remains largely unchanged.
Like most phone companies, Vodafone 
Greece uses the same kind of computer for 
both its mobile switching centers and its 
base station controllers—Ericsson’s AXE 
line of switches. A central processor coordi­
nates the switch’s operations and directs the 
switch to set up a speech or data path from 
one phone to another and then routes a call 
through it. Logs of network activity and bill­
ing records are stored on disk by a separate 
unit, called a management processor.
The key to understanding the hack at the 
heart of the Athens affair is knowing how 
the Ericsson AXE allows lawful intercepts—
what are popularly called “wiretaps.” 
Though the details differ from country to 
country, in Greece, as in most places, the 
process starts when a law enforcement offi­
cial goes to a court and obtains a warrant, 
which is then presented to the phone com­
pany whose customer is to be tapped.
Nowadays, all wiretaps are carried out 
at the central office. In AXE exchanges a 
remote­control equipment subsystem, or 
RES, carries out the phone tap by moni­
toring the speech and data streams of 
switched calls. It is a software subsystem 
typically used for setting up wiretaps, 
which only law officers are supposed to 
have access to. When the wiretapped 
phone makes a call, the RES copies the 
conversation into a second data stream 
and diverts that copy to a phone line used 
by law enforcement officials.
Ericsson optionally provides an inter­
ception management system (IMS), through 
which lawful call intercepts are set up and 
managed. When a court order is presented 
to the phone company, its operators initi­
ate an intercept by filling out a dialog box 
in the IMS software. The optional IMS in 
the operator interface and the RES in the 
exchange each contain a list of wiretaps: 
wiretap requests in the case of the IMS, 
actual taps in the RES. Only IMS­initiated 
wiretaps should be active in the RES, so a 
wiretap in the RES without a request for a 
tap in the IMS is a pretty good indicator 
that an unauthorized tap has occurred. An 
audit procedure can be used to find any 
discrepancies between them.
It turns out Vodafone had not purchased 
the lawful intercept option at the time of the 
illegal wiretaps, and the IMS phone­tapping 
management software was not installed 
on Vodafone’s systems. But in early 2003, 
Vodafone technicians upgraded the Greek 
switches to release R9.1 of the AXE soft­
ware suite. That upgrade included the RES 
software, according to a letter from Ericsson 
that accompanied the upgrade. So after the 
upgrade, the Vodafone system contained the 
software code necessary to intercept calls 
using the RES, even though it lacked the 
high­level user interface in the IMS nor­
mally used to facilitate such intercepts.
That odd circumstance would turn out 
to play a role in letting the Athens hackers 
illegally listen in on calls and yet escape 
detection for months and months.
iT Took guile and some serious program­
ming chops to manipulate the lawful call­
intercept functions in Vodafone’s mobile 
switching centers. The intruders’ task 
was particularly complicated because they 
needed to install and operate the wiretap­
ping software on the exchanges without 
being detected by Vodafone or Ericsson 
system administrators. From time to time 
the intruders needed access to the rogue 
software to update the lists of monitored 
numbers and shadow phones. These activi­
ties had to be kept off all logs, while the 
software itself had to be invisible to the 
system administrators conducting rou­
tine maintenance activities. The intruders 
achieved all these objectives.
They took advantage of the fact that the 
AXE allows new software to be installed 
without rebooting the system, an impor­
tant feature when any interruption would 
disconnect phone calls, lose text mes­
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Tsalikidis
2006
9 Mar Costas Tsalikidis, head of 
 network planning of Vodafone Greece 
is found hanged in his apartment.
10 Mar Koronias briefs Giannis 
Angelou, director of the prime 
minister’s political office.
10 Mar The Greek presidential 
decree specifying lawful intercep­
tion procedures takes effect.
16 Mar Vodafone sends e­mail to 
Ericsson asking for the return of all 
exchange backup data.
Jul Vodafone, follow­
ing its data retention 
policies, destroys the 
visitor sign­in books 
at one exchange 
facility.
Jul Vodafone 
upgrades two of the 
access servers, wiping 
out access logs.
4 Mar Ericsson informs Vodafone  
of the existence of rogue software.
4 Mar Shadow phones make no further calls.
7 Mar Vodafone locates the rogue software.
8 Mar Vodafone extracts a list of logged phone 
numbers from MEAKS.
8 Mar Vodafone Greece CEO Giorgos Koronias  
orders removal of the rogue software.
31 Oct Vodafone 
places an order 
with Ericsson for LI 
software.
18 Nov Ericsson 
delivers LI soft­
ware to Vodafone.
8 Mar The govern­
ment security agency, 
ADAE, presents its 
first interim report 
on the case to the 
Parliament Committee 
on Institutions and 
Transparency.
23 Mar ADAE performs 
a simulation of the 
rogue software.
14 Dec ADAE fines Vodafone 
€76 million (US $99.4 million).
JAN MAR MAy JUl                                    SEP NOV JAN MAR MAy NOV
1 Feb Public prosecutor 
of the Supreme Court 
finishes the preliminary 
investigation.
2 Feb The government 
provides details of the case 
in a press conference.
2 Feb Criminal prosecution 
for the violation of commu­
nications privacy and pos­
sibly spying is ordered.
Voulgarakis
7 Apr ADAE publishes its second 
interim report on the case.
Koronias
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sages, and render emergency services 
unreachable. To let an AXE exchange 
run continuously for decades, as many 
of them do, Ericsson’s software uses sev­
eral techniques for handling failures and 
upgrading an exchange’s software with­
out suspending its operation. These tech­
niques allow the direct patching of code 
loaded in the central processor, in effect 
altering the operating system on the fly.
Modern GSM systems, such as 
Vodafone’s, secure the wireless links with a 
sophisticated encryption mechanism. A call 
to another cellphone will be re­encrypted 
between the remote cellphone and its clos­
est base station, but it is not protected while 
it transits the provider’s core network. For 
this reason—and for the ease of monitoring 
calls from the comfort of their lair—the per­
petrators of the Vodafone wiretaps attacked 
the core switches of the Vodafone network. 
Encrypting communications from the start 
of the chain to its end—as banks, for exam­
ple, do—makes it very difficult to implement 
legal wiretaps.
To simplify software maintenance, the 
AXE has detailed rules for directly patch­
ing software running on its central proces­
sor. The AXE’s existing code is structured 
around independent blocks, or program 
modules, which are stored in the central 
processor’s memory. The release being used 
in 2004 consisted of about 1760 blocks. Each 
contains a small “correction area,” used 
whenever software is updated with a patch.
Let’s say you’re patching in code to force 
the computer to do a new function, Z, in 
situations where it has been doing a differ­
ent function, Y. So, for example, where the 
original software had an instruction, “If X, 
then do Y” the patched software says, in 
effect, “If X, then go to the correction area 
location L.” The software goes to location L 
and executes the instructions it finds there, 
that is, Z. In other words, a software patch 
works by replacing an instruction at the 
area of the code to be fixed with an instruc­
tion that diverts the program to a memory 
location in the correction area containing 
the new version of the code.
The challenge faced by the intruders was 
to use the RES’s capabilities to duplicate 
and divert the bits of a call stream without 
using the dialog­box interface to the IMS, 
which would create auditable logs of their 
activities. The intruders pulled this off by 
installing a series of patches to 29 separate 
blocks of code, according to Ericsson offi­
cials who testified before the Greek par­
liamentary committee that inves­
tigated the wiretaps. This rogue 
software modified the central 
processor’s software to directly 
initiate a wiretap, using the RES’s 
capabilities. Best of all, for them, 
the taps were not visible to the 
operators, because the IMS and its 
user interface weren’t used.
The full version of the software 
would have recorded the phone 
numbers being tapped in an offi­
cial registry within the exchange. 
And, as we noted, an audit could 
then find a discrepancy between 
the numbers monitored by the 
exchange and the warrants active 
in the IMS. But the rogue software 
bypassed the IMS. Instead, it cleverly stored 
the bugged numbers in two data areas that 
were part of the rogue software’s own mem­
ory space, which was within the switch’s 
memory but isolated and not made known 
to the rest of the switch.
That by itself put the rogue soft­
ware a long way toward escaping detec­
tion. But the perpetrators hid their own 
tracks in a number of other ways as well. 
There were a variety of circumstances by 
which Vodafone technicians could have 
discovered the alterations to the AXE’s 
software blocks. For example, they could 
have taken a listing of all the blocks, which 
would show all the active processes run­
ning within the AXE—similar to the task 
manager output in Microsoft Windows 
or the process status (ps) output in Unix. 
They then would have seen that some pro­
cesses were active, though they shouldn’t 
have been. But the rogue software appar­
ently modified the commands that list 
the active blocks in a way that omitted 
certain blocks—the ones that related to 
intercepts—from any such listing.
In addition, the rogue software might 
have been discovered during a software 
upgrade or even when Vodafone techni­
cians installed a minor patch. It is stan­
dard practice in the telecommunications 
industry for technicians to verify the 
existing block contents before performing 
an upgrade or patch. We don’t know why 
the rogue software was not detected in this 
way, but we suspect that the software also 
modified the operation of the command 
used to print the checksums—codes that 
create a kind of signature against which 
the integrity of the existing blocks can be 
validated. One way or another, the blocks 
appeared unaltered to the operators.
Finally, the software included a back 
door to allow the perpetrators to control 
it in the future. This, too, was cleverly 
constructed to avoid detec­
tion. A report by the Hellenic 
Authority for the Information 
and Communication Security 
and Privacy (the Greek abbre­
viation is ADAE) indicates 
that the rogue software modi­
fied the exchange’s command 
parser—a routine that accepts 
commands from a person with 
system administrator status—
so that innocuous commands 
followed by six spaces would 
deactivate the exchange’s 
transaction log and the alarm 
associated with its deactiva­
tion, and allow the execution 
of commands associated with 
the lawful interception subsystem. In effect, 
it was a signal to allow operations associ­
ated with the wiretaps but leave no trace of 
them. It also added a new user name and 
password to the system, which could be 
used to obtain access to the exchange.
Software that not only alters operat­
ing system code but also hides its tracks 
is called a “rootkit.” The term is known 
to the public—if at all—because of one 
that the record label Sony BMG Music 
Entertainment included on some music 
CDs released in 2005. The Sony rootkit 
restricted copying of CDs; it burrowed into 
the Windows operating system on PCs and 
then hid its existence from the owner. (Sony 
stopped using rootkits because of a gen­
eral public outcry.) Security experts have 
also discovered other rootkits for general­
purpose operating systems, such as Linux, 
Windows, and Solaris, but to our knowl­
edge this is the first time a rootkit has been 
observed on a special­purpose system, in 
this case an Ericsson telephone switch.
wiTh all of This sophisTicaTed subterfuge, 
how then was the rogue software finally 
discovered? On 24 January 2005, the perpe­
trators updated their planted software. That 
upgrade interfered with the forwarding of 
text messages, which went undelivered. 
These undelivered text messages, in turn, 
triggered an automated failure report.
 At this point, the hackers’ abilities to 
keep their modifications to the switch’s 
AXE software suite secret met their limits, 
as it’s almost impossible to hide secrets in 
somebody else’s system.
The AXE, like most large software sys­
tems, logs all manner of network activity. 
System administrators can review the log 
files, and any events they can’t account for 
as ordinary usage can be investigated.
It’s impossible to overstate the impor­
tance of logging. For example, in the 1986 
Cuckoo’s Egg intrusion, the wily network 
administrator, Clifford Stoll, was asked 
to investigate a 75 U.S. cents account­
ing error. Stoll spent 10 months looking 
for the hacker, who had penetrated deep 
into the networks of Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory, a U.S. nuclear weap­
ons lab in California. Much of that time 
he spent poring over thousands of log 
report pages.
The AXE, like most sophisticated sys­
tems nowadays, can help operators find 
the nuggets of useful information within 
the voluminous logs it generates. It is pro­
grammed to report anomalous activity on 
its own, in the form of error or failure 
reports. In addition, at regular intervals 
the switching center generates a snapshot 
of itself—a copy, or dump, of all its pro­
grams and data.
Dumps are most commonly consulted 
for recovery and diagnostic purposes, but 
they can be used in security investigations. 
So when Ericsson’s investigators were called 
in because of the undelivered text messages, 
the first thing they did was look closely at 
the periodic dumps. They found two areas 
containing all the phone numbers being 
monitored and retrieved a list of them.
The investigators examined the dumps 
more thoroughly and found the rogue pro­
grams. What they found though, was in the 
form of executable code—in other words, 
code in the binary language that micro­
processors directly execute. Executable 
code is what results when a software 
compiler turns source code—in the case 
of the AXE, programs written in the PLEX 
 language—into the binary machine code 
that a computer processor executes. So the 
investigators painstakingly reconstructed 
an approximation of the original PLEX 
source files that the intruders developed. 
It turned out to be the equivalent of about 
6500 lines of code, a surprisingly substan­
tial piece of software.
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the rogue 
software 
stored 
bugged 
phone 
numbers 
in its own 
memory 
space
The investigators ran the modules in 
simulated environments to better under­
stand their behavior. The result of all this 
investigative effort was the discovery of 
the data areas holding the tapped numbers 
and the time stamps of recent intercepts.
With this information on hand, the 
investigators could go back and look at ear­
lier dumps to establish the time interval 
during which the wiretaps were in effect 
and to get the full list of intercepted num­
bers and call data for the tapped conver­
sations—who called whom, when, and for 
how long. (The actual conversations were 
not stored in the logs.)
While the hack was complex, the taps 
themselves were straightforward. When 
the prime minister, for example, initiated 
or received a call on his cellphone, the 
exchange would establish the same kind 
of connection used in a lawful wiretap—
a connection to a shadow number allow­
ing it to listen in on the conversation.
Creating the rogue software so that it 
would remain undetected required a lot of 
expertise in writing AXE code, an esoteric 
competency that isn’t readily available in 
most places. But as it happens, for the past 
15 years, a considerable part of Ericsson’s 
software development for the AXE has 
been done under contract by a Greek com­
pany based in Athens, Intracom Telecom, 
part of Intracom Holdings. The necessary 
know­how was available locally and was 
spread over a large number of present and 
past Intracom developers. So could this 
have been an inside job?
The early stages of the infiltration would 
have been much easier to pull off with the 
assistance of someone inside Vodafone, 
but there is no conclusive evidence to 
support that scenario. The infiltration 
could have been carried out remotely and, 
indeed, according to a state report, in the 
case of the failed text messages where the 
exact time of the event is known, the last 
person to access the exchange had been 
issued a visitor’s badge.
Similarly, we may never know whether 
Tsalikidis had anything to do with the 
wiretaps. Many observers have found 
the timing of his death highly suggestive, 
but to this day no connection has been 
uncovered. Nor can observers do more 
than speculate as to the motives of the 
infiltrators. [See the sidebar, “An Inside 
Job?” for a summary of the leading specu­
lation; we can neither endorse nor refute 
the theories presented.]
Just as we cannot now know for certain 
who was behind the Athens affair or what 
their motives were, we can only specu­
late about various approaches that the 
intruders may have followed to carry out 
their attack. That’s because key material 
has been lost or was never collected. For 
instance, in July 2005, while the investiga­
tion was taking place, Vodafone upgraded 
two of the three servers used for accessing 
the exchange management system. This 
upgrade wiped out the access logs and, 
contrary to company policy, no backups 
were retained. Some time later a six­month 
retention period for visitor sign­in books 
lapsed, and Vodafone destroyed the books 
corresponding to the period where the 
rogue software was modified, triggering 
the text­message errors.
Traces of the rogue software installation 
might have been recorded on the exchange’s 
transaction logs. However, due to a paucity 
of storage space in the exchange’s man­
agement systems, the logs were retained 
for only five days, because Vodafone 
 considers billing data, which competes 
for the same space, a lot more important. 
Most crucially, Vodafone’s deactivation of 
the rogue software on 7 March 2005 almost 
certainly alerted the conspirators, giving 
them a chance to switch off the shadow 
phones. As a result investigators missed 
the opportunity of triangulating the loca­
tion of the shadow phones and catching the 
perpetrators in the act.
so whaT can This affair teach us about 
how to protect phone networks?
Once the infiltration was discov­
ered, Vodafone had to balance the need 
for the continued operation of the net­
work with the discovery and prosecution 
of the guilty parties. Unfortunately, the 
responses of Vodafone and that of Greek 
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an inside Job?
By Steven Cherry  
& Harry Goldstein 
No mystery novel is complete without 
the reader finding out “who done it,” but 
real life is usually messier than fiction. In 
the Athens affair, we can only speculate 
about who may have been behind the most 
 spectacular cell-system penetration ever.
The hackers’ facility with the esoteric 
art of programming the Ericsson AXE 
central-office switch convinced some that 
the criminals were either employees of 
Vodafone Greece or of Intracom Telecom.
Intracom has aroused suspicion 
because it provided key software to 
Ericsson and because the Greek company 
is a major telecommunications equipment 
supplier to Greece’s dominant carrier, OTE 
Group. Given that the majority of OTE’s 
shares are owned by the Greek state, a 
business having large dealings with OTE 
would have had a strong incentive to tap 
the phones of the ruling party in order 
to check on whether any of the deals it 
or OTE had set up under the previous 
 government were in danger of being 
derailed. Under this theory, phone taps for 
Arabs and members of antiauthoritarian 
groups were installed to send investigators 
on a wild goose chase.
But what really raised eyebrows was 
the fact that one of the hacked Vodafone 
exchanges was located on the campus 
of the main Intracom facility. Anyone 
wishing to enter that particular Vodafone 
facility would have had to go through the 
Intracom gates, meaning that visitors to 
the Vodafone exchange would have been 
logged twice. Unfortunately, the visitor 
records for the exchange were destroyed 
by Vodafone in accord with routine pro-
cedures, despite the extraordinary cir-
cumstances. So investigators had only the 
Intracom visitor records, which would not 
record any visits to the Vodafone exchange 
by Intracom personnel.
The leading cause for suspecting the 
employees of Vodafone Greece is the 
suicide of its head of network planning, 
Costas Tsalikidis. yet the deceased’s fam-
ily questions whether it was a suicide at 
all. The family’s attorney, Themistokles 
Sofos, has stated, “I am certain that Costas 
Tsalikidis did not commit suicide, and that 
makes me believe he probably gained 
knowledge of the phone tapping through 
his diligence with all matters professional.” 
Thus, speculation is divided between theo-
ries that say Tsalikidis committed suicide 
because his involvement was about to 
be discovered and those that argue that 
Tsalikidis was murdered because he had 
discovered, or was about to discover, who 
the perpetrators were.
Another popular theory posits that the 
U.S. National Security Agency, Central 
Intelligence Agency, or some other U.S. spy 
agency did it. The location of the monitored 
phones correlates nicely with apartments 
and other property under the control of the 
U.S. Embassy in Athens.
Under this theory, phone taps of Arabs 
and members of antiauthoritarian groups 
were installed because of fears of a ter-
rorist attack on the Athens Olympics. It is 
widely believed that these U.S. agencies, 
particularly the NSA, have all the neces-
sary tools and expertise for mounting such 
an attack. n
law enforcement were both inadequate. 
Through Vodafone’s actions, critical data 
were lost or destroyed, while the perpe­
trators not only received a warning that 
their scheme had been discovered but also 
had sufficient time to disappear.
In the telecommunications indus­
try, prevailing best practices require that 
the operator’s policies include procedures 
for responding to an infiltration, such as 
a virus attack: retain all data, isolate the 
part of the system that’s been broken into 
as much as possible, coordinate activities 
with law enforcement.
Greek federal telecom regulations also 
specify that operators have security poli­
cies that detail the measures they will take 
to ensure the confidentiality of customer 
communications and the privacy of network 
users. However, Vodafone’s 
response indicates that such 
policies, if they existed, were 
ignored. If not for press con­
ferences and public investiga­
tions, law enforcement could 
have watched the behavior of 
the shadow cellphones sur­
reptitiously. Physical logbooks 
of visitors were lost and data 
logs were destroyed. In addi­
tion, neither law enforcement 
authorities nor the ADAE, the 
independent security and pri­
vacy authority, was contacted 
directly. Instead, Vodafone Greece com­
municated through a political channel—
the prime minister’s office. It should be 
noted the ADAE was a fairly new organi­
zation at the time, formed in 2003.
The response of Greek law enforcement 
officials also left a lot to be desired. Police 
could have secured evidence by impounding 
all of Vodafone’s telecommunications and 
computer equipment involved in the inci­
dent. Instead it appears that concerns about 
disruption to the operation of the mobile 
telephone network led the authorities to take 
a more light­handed approach—essentially 
interviewing employees and collecting 
information provided by Vodafone—that 
ultimately led to the loss of forensic evidence. 
They eventually started leveling accusations 
at both the operator (Vodafone) and the 
vendor (Ericsson), turning the victims into 
defendants and losing their good will, which 
further hampered their investigation.
Of course, in countries where such high­
tech crimes are rare, it is unreasonable to 
expect to find a crack team of investigators. 
Could a rapid deployment force be set up to 
handle such high­profile and highly techni­
cal incidents? We’d like to see the interna­
tional police organization Interpol create a 
cyberforensics response team that countries 
could call on to handle such incidents.
Telephone exchanges have evolved 
over the decades into software­based sys­
tems, and therefore the task of analyzing 
them for vulnerabilities has become very 
difficult. Even as new software features, 
such as conferencing, number portabil­
ity, and caller identification, have been 
loaded onto the exchanges, the old soft­
ware remains in place. Complex inter­
actions between subsystems and baroque 
coding styles (some of them remnants of 
programs written 20 or 30 years ago) con­
found developers and auditors alike.
Yet an effective defense against viruses, 
worms, and rootkits depends crucially on 
in­depth analysis that can penetrate source 
code in all its baroque heterogeneity. For 
example, a statistical analysis of 
the call logs might have revealed 
a correlation between the calls 
to the shadow numbers and 
calls to the monitored numbers. 
Telephone companies already 
carry out extensive analysis on 
these sorts of data to spot cus­
tomer trends. But from the secu­
rity perspective, this analysis is 
done for the wrong reasons and 
by the wrong people—market­
ing as opposed to security. By 
training security personnel to 
use these tools and allowing 
them access to these data, customer trend 
analysis can become an effective counter­
measure against rogue software.
Additional clues could be uncovered 
by merging call records generated by the 
exchange with billing and accounting 
information. Doing so, though, involves 
consolidating distinct data sets currently 
owned by different entities within the 
telecom organization.
Another defense is regular auditing of 
the type that allowed Ericsson to discover 
the rogue software by scrutinizing the off­
line dumps. However, in this case, as well 
as in the data analysis case, we have to be 
sure that any rogue software cannot modify 
the information stored in the logs or the 
dumps, such as by using a separate moni­
toring computer running its own software.
Digital systems generate enormous 
volumes of information. Ericsson and 
Vodafone Greece had at their fingertips all 
the information they needed to discover 
the penetration of Vodafone’s network 
long before an undelivered text message 
sent them looking. As in other industries, 
the challenge now is to come up with ways 
to use this information. If one company’s 
technicians and one country’s police force 
cannot meet this challenge, a response 
team that can needs to be created.
It is particularly important not to 
turn the investigation into a witch hunt. 
Especially in cases where the perpetrators 
are unlikely to be identified, it is often 
politically expedient to use the tele­
com operator as a convenient scapegoat. 
This only encourages operators and their 
employees to brush incidents under the 
carpet, and turns them into adversaries 
of law enforcement. Rather than looking 
for someone to blame (and punish), it is 
far better to determine exactly what went 
wrong and how it can be fixed, not only 
for that particular operator, but for the 
industry as a whole.
Merely saying—or even legislating—
that system vendors and network opera­
tors should not allow something like 
this to occur is pointless, because there 
is little that can be done to these com­
panies after the fact. Instead, proactive 
measures should be taken to ensure that 
such systems are developed and operated 
safely. Perhaps we can borrow a few pages 
from aviation safety, where both aircraft 
manufacturers and airline companies are 
closely monitored by national and inter­
national agencies to ensure the safety of 
airline passengers. n
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TO PROBE FURTHER
The Wikipedia article http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Greek_telephone_tapping_
case_2004-2005 contains additional 
links to press stories and background 
material.
Ericsson’s Interception Management 
System user manual (marked confiden-
tial) is available on the Web through a 
Google search: http://www.google.com/
search?q=IMS+ericsson+manual or at 
http://cryptome.org/ericsson-ims.htm.
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